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After five days of street protests and strikes, President Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega, secretary
general of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN), agreed to start negotiations on
five major economic areas. Opinion varied as to whether the talks represented capitulation on the
part of the president and his conservative Alianza Liberal or the start of power-sharing with the
FSLN opposition. The pact came just in time for commentators to include it in their analyses of the
president's first 100 days in office.

FSLN demands shift in government economic policy
Sandinista leaders threatened "to paralyze the country" with a general strike and protest beginning
April 14 to force radical changes in Aleman's economic policies. The protest originated with
demands from farmers for the suspension of foreclosures against debts owed to the state bank. The
FSLN quickly supported the movement and expanded it to cover other economic issues, especially
the administration's new agrarian program and the dismissal of government employees belonging
to the FSLN.
Aleman tried to head off the protest by sending a proposal on April 10 to the National Assembly
that would suspend legal action against debtors for one year, but the Sandinistas wanted concrete
results, not proposals, before calling off the protest. For example, Ortega said he wanted to see
evictions of urban property holders halted and a law passed to suspend further evictions before
agreeing to negotiate with Aleman on outstanding issues. The strategy of the protest was to block
streets and highways to interfere with the country's normal work routine. Although some injuries
and a few arrests were reported, there appeared to be no orchestrated violence or confrontations.
Police quickly removed the major street barricades in Managua, although protestors were able to
disrupt transportation on intercity highways throughout the five-day demonstration. From April
10 to April 18, the administration's reaction to the protest underwent a swift transformation, which
some conservative critics of the government described as a surrender to FSLN "blackmail." As the
protest loomed, Aleman called FSLN leaders "hotheads," "incompetents," and "ignoramuses." He
insisted on referring to the protest as an "insurrection" and warned of possible violence from the
FSLN. Meanwhile security forces prepared for rioting by sending 5,000 heavily armed police and an
undisclosed number of army troops into the streets.
Interior Minister Jose Antonio Alvarado publicly accused FSLN leaders of planning acts of terrorism
such as blowing up bridges. On the first day of the protest, police estimated the turnout in Managua
at no more than 5,000 participants, prompting government spokespersons to say that the FSLN was
losing support among its own followers. Foreign Relations Minster Emilio Alvarez said that recent
initiatives by the administration to give land titles to small holders had eroded the social base of
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the FSLN, leaving it nothing to do but defend the position of party leaders and the property they
acquired through confiscation in the so-called "pinata" after the election of 1990.

Daniel Ortega proposes power sharing
On the other hand, the outcome appears to support the FSLN view that the protest was strong
enough to force Aleman into negotiations with the FSLN on basic administration policies. Talks
that had begun in January between the two leaders on a variety of issues were broken off in March
when the negotiators failed to agree on how to settle the issue of confiscated property (see NotiCen,
03/13/97).
The FSLN had complained that the administration was publicly focusing on the relatively few
properties taken by FSLN leaders after the 1990 election loss to Violeta de Chamorro, while doing
nothing to guarantee titles to thousands of needy campesinos who had received small parcels
under the agrarian reform of the 1980s. Furthermore, despite promises during his 1996 presidential
campaign to protect land titles for the small beneficiaries of the confiscations, Aleman is seeking to
annul land titles and claims affecting 300,000 rural families and 60% of the productive farm land.
The FSLN is particularly keen on protecting the 12,000 beneficiaries of the worker-owned lands
(Area Propriedad de los Trabajadores), who form a crucial element of the party's support. To settle
these issues and end the protest, Ortega demanded that the bill the president sent to the Assembly
on April 10 be considered first by a special committee made up of government appointees and
Sandinistas. He also demanded a national dialogue on other issues as well as the presence of
foreign observers to guarantee compliance with any agreements made. He went so far as to question
Aleman's legitimacy as president and to insist on a power-sharing pact between the administration
and the FSLN.

Aleman offers concessions
Aleman held to the administration line that the mobilization had been rejected by the public and
that Ortega was dealing from a position of weakness. Nevertheless, on the second day of the protest,
he offered concessions in exchange for public order, though rejecting Ortega's demand for foreign
involvement and direct Sandinista participation in legislative hearings.
On April 17, Aleman announced that he had reached agreement on some issues with Ortega
during a three-hour telephone conversation. As the first result of the talk, he said he would ask
the Assembly to suspend for three months all evictions from land received under the Sandinista
agrarian reforms. The next day, Aleman and Ortega signed an agreement ending the five-day
protest. In accordance with the pact, Aleman began installing special committees to examine the
issues of confiscated property, transportation, social questions, sectoral reforms, and production.
The committees are to come up with recommendations in 30 days. FSLN leaders met on April 20 to
name delegates to the committees.
The administration has promised to include labor unions in all discussions relevant to them. Pact
gets mixed reception Aleman defended the pact, arguing that talking with his adversaries is not the
same as giving away power. While he interpreted the pact as a sign of statesmanship, others saw
it as weakness. Many critics of the pact, such as former Nicaraguan ambassador to Chile Roberto
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Ferrey, accused the administration of "surrendering" to FSLN pressure. "I think the government is
now completely compromised and is subject to permanent daily blackmail from the Sandinistas,"
said Ferrey.
Sergio Ramirez, former Sandinista and now leader of the Movimiento de Renovacion Sandinista
(MRS), agreed with many conservative and pro-government commentators who thought the pact
marked capitulation and a sharp change in the balance of power between the administration and the
FSLN. "A form of cogovernance has been established and the most surprising thing is the swiftness
with which President Aleman backed down," he said.

Aleman completes first 100 days in office
The protest and subsequent pact coincided with the end of Aleman's first hundred days in office.
Assessments of his record, therefore, concentrated heavily on his handling of the protest. Ramirez
and others blamed Aleman for highhanded policies that sacrificed popular support for partisan
goals, such as the return of confiscated property to former members of Anastasio Somoza Debayle's
regime, overthrown by the FSLN in 1979.
Another former Sandinista, Carlos Tunnerman, said that the main characteristics of the first
100 days are the administration's lack of "concrete economic and social programs" and signs of
impulsive decision-making. Nevertheless, others pointed to the April 18 pact as an example of
Aleman's ability to solve complex national problems and avoid violent confrontations. [Sources:
Inter Press Service, 04/09/97; Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 04/03/97, 04/10/97; Reuter,
04/14/97, 04/18/97; Spanish News Service EFE, 04/12/97, 04/15/97, 04/16/97, 04/19/97; Ciberdiario
(Nicaragua), 04/19/97; Notifax (Nicaragua), 04/21/97; Agence France-Presse, 04/19/97, 04/20/97,
04/21/97; La Prensa (Nicaragua), 04/15/97, 04/16/97, 04/17/97, 04/21/97, 04/22/97]
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